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Abstract
Ireland’s selective system of collective agreed minimum wages has come under significant pressure 
in recent years. A new fast-food employer body took a constitutional challenge against the system 
of Joint Labour Committees (JLCs) and this was strengthened by the discourse on the negative 
effects of minimum wages as Ireland’s economic crisis worsened. Taking a historical institutional 
approach, the article examines the critical juncture for the JLC system and the factors which 
led to the subsequent government decision to retain but reform the system. The article argues 
that the improved enforcement of minimum wages was a key factor in the employers’ push for 
abolition of the system but that the legacy of a collapsed social partnership system prevented the 
system’s abolition.
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Introduction
While countries have struggled to respond to the global recession, and many have 
introduced austerity measures, there has been a mixture of responses with regard to 
minimum wages. Some countries like the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Latvia, 
Luxembourg and Portugal have increased their National Minimum Wage (NMW) 
while others such as the Czech Republic and Estonia have had minimum wage freezes 
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(European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2011). 
In Ireland the NMW was reduced in February 2011 by over 11%, but this was reversed 
in June 2011 by a new government. In addition to the NMW, Ireland also has a system 
of legally binding minimum wages covering 11 sectors. The focus of this article is on 
these sectoral minimum wages set by Joint Labour Committees (JLCs), which have 
been in existence since the early 1900s. The majority of JLCs set basic minimum pay 
rates in excess of the NMW and they also set overtime rates, Sunday premiums and 
minimum conditions of employment like sick pay schemes (O’Sullivan and Wallace, 
2011).
Until recently there was relatively little public policy attention paid to the JLC 
system, but this has changed in recent years as there has been increasing pressure to 
abolish it. JLCs are statutory bodies composed of employer and employee representa-
tives and an independent chair which set legally binding minimum pay and conditions 
for vulnerable workers through Employment Regulation Orders (EROs);1 analogous 
to the system of Wages Councils that existed in the UK until 1993. Lowndes (1996: 
193) has argued that, ‘stability is a defining feature of institutions’ and this has been 
the case for much of the life of JLCs. However, a recent major driver for change was 
a legal case taken against the JLC for the catering industry in 2008 by a fast-food 
employer and a new employers’ organisation, the Quick Service Food Alliance 
(QSFA). The QSFA was formed in April 2008 and represents over 180 members with 
a mixture of multinationals such as McDonald’s, Subway, Supermac’s, the Bagel 
Factory and other independent outlets (Higgins, 2009; ww.qsfa.ie). In their legal chal-
lenge the employers argued that JLCs were unconstitutional because they were setting 
legally binding regulations which, according to the Irish Constitution, only Parliament 
has the authority to do.
In June 2011, the High Court found in favour of the fast-food employers and deemed 
that the Catering JLC was unconstitutional. The subsequent High Court decision left the 
JLC system in a state of limbo, leaving important worker protections under threat. This 
decision served to strengthen the position of other employers who sought the abolition of 
JLCs because they were ‘costing jobs’ (Sweeney and O’Brien, 2011; Wall, 2011). Their 
argument gained a lot of traction in the context of Ireland’s financial and economic crisis. 
When Ireland received a financial bail-out from the International Monetary Fund, the 
European Union and the European Central Bank in late 2010, the Irish government com-
mitted to reviewing the JLC system in order to increase flexibility in the labour market 
(IMF, 2010). The government’s choices were to introduce legislation to retain or abolish 
JLCs or avoid taking action and let the High Court decision stand, leaving JLCs in a legal 
limbo and effectively become obsolete. In the end, the government chose the middle 
ground: it has introduced draft legislation to reinstate JLCs but their powers will be cur-
tailed and their decision-making processes will become more complex. Taking a histori-
cal institutional approach and drawing on the theory of path dependency, the article 
examines the way in which the JLCs work in practice and the employers’ legal case in 
pushing for the abolition of JLCs. We also examine the role of the government in respond-
ing to the drivers for change and consider the resultant transformation of JLCs. We begin 
with a review of research methods.
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Research methods
The findings are based on semi-structured interviews carried out between March 2009 
and May 2010 (Table 1) and an analysis of documentary materials. Interviews were con-
ducted with the QSFA including McDonald’s and Supermac’s (Ireland’s largest fast-food 
group) and employer associations which sit on the Catering JLC: Ireland’s largest 
employer body, the Irish Business and Employers Confederation and the Vintners 
Federation of Ireland (abbreviations are presented in Table 1). We interviewed the 
Services Industrial Professional and Technical Union, which represents workers on the 
JLCs and conducted a telephone interview with a senior representative of the National 
Employment Rights Authority, a state body which is responsible for enforcing JLC regu-
lations. At the time of interviewing, the main opposition political party was Fine Gael 
and it was vocal on the effects of JLC regulations on business so we interviewed the Fine 
Gael Spokesperson on Enterprise, Trade and Employment. Since elections in February 
2011, Fine Gael has been the lead party in a coalition government. We interviewed rep-
resentatives from the Migrant Rights Centre of Ireland, which has been critical of the 
QSFA challenge, observed a worker protest organised by the MRCI outside a Supermac’s 
outlet in April 2010 and interviewed workers who took part in it. The interviews were 
between half an hour and two hours in duration and were recorded and transcribed or 
notes were taken. Our interview data were also supplemented by emails with some of the 
respondents. The interviews were supplemented with data from a number of key docu-
ments. These were (1) High Court case documents involving the QSFA and the JLCs, (2) 
two government-commissioned reviews on the JLC system (Duffy and Walsh, 2011; 
O’Sullivan and Wallace, 2005), (3) National Employment Rights Authority reports on 
compliance with JLC regulations, (4) Labour Court documents on a case taken by a fast-
food employer disputing their obligation to pay JLC wage rates, (5) two pieces of pro-
posed legislation on JLC reform: the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Bill 2009 and 
the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Bill 2011 and (6) news articles from the weekly 
magazine, the Industrial Relations News. We used an historical institutional approach to 
ascertain how and why JLCs changed and thematic analysis was used across the data set. 
We started with broad headings in mind (‘QSFA constitutional challenge’, ‘government 
role’) related to the overall research objectives: what triggered the QSFA’s legal chal-
lenge and why did the government choose the course of action it did in relation to JLCs? 
In line with thematic analysis, we familiarised ourselves with the data, generated initial 
codes and searched for themes based on their frequency and ‘keyness’ (Braun and Clarke, 
2008).
Institutional stability and change
Most definitions of institutions emphasise their persistence or ‘status quo bias’, that is, 
that they are difficult to change even when economic and social conditions change 
(Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Pierson, 2000; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 18). The theory 
of path dependency emphasises the importance of history in explaining current institu-
tional features and phenomena and, depending on the version of path dependency, can 
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focus on either a ‘persistent diffusion’ path or ‘branching pathways’ (Ebbinghaus, 2005). 
The persistent diffusion path ‘stresses the spontaneous evolution of an institution and its 
subsequent long-term entrenchment’ and self-reinforcing or feedback processes contrib-
ute to the institution becoming ‘locked-in’ (Ebbinghaus, 2005: 5, 10). In this scenario, it 
becomes costly for actors to change the direction of the institution (Levi, 1997; Pierson, 
2000). Ebbinghaus (2005: 11) criticises the notion of ‘lock-in’ because it excludes the 
possibility of the gradual adaptation of an institution and it has been argued in some 
institutional change literature that even gradual change can result in major changes in 
institutions with the passage of time (Erickson and Kuruvilla, 1998; Thelen, 2009). The 
‘branching pathways’ version of path dependency emphasises the particular historical 
origins of institutions through ‘the conscious choices by collective actors at critical junc-
tures’ (Ebbinghaus, 2005: 16). Critical junctures are important in the institutional change 
literature which focuses on dramatic rather than continuous and incremental change 
(Krasner, 1984: 234). In this dramatic change or punctuated equilibrium model of insti-
tutional change, there are long periods of stability and these are interrupted with crises 
associated with an exogenous shock that ‘opens the door for significant institutional 
innovation’ (Thelen, 2009: 474). During times of stability, there may be incremental 
adjustments but without a change to the deep structures of the institution (Gersick, 1991). 
In times of revolutionary change, the deep structure of the institution is dismantled, 
‘leaving the system temporarily disorganized’ and the system is reconfigured according 
to a new set of rules (Gersick, 1991: 19). The changes produced by the crisis can vary 
and the changes can harm or benefit the system (Gersick, 1991). Busenberg (2003) notes 
that periods of significant change are often caused when attention to an issue has 
expanded from subsystem politics (consisting of those individuals active in a policy 
domain) to the macro-political system (government leaders and the public). Historical 
Table 1. Interviews and abbreviations.
Organisation/interviewees Number of interviews
Quick Service Food Alliance (QSFA)  
 Senior representative 1
 McDonald’s 1
 Supermac’s 1
Employer associations on JLCs  
 Irish Business & Employers Confederation (IBEC) 1
 Vintners Federation of Ireland (VFI) 1
Trade union on JLCs  
 Services Industrial Professional and Technical Union (SIPTU) 1
Migrant Rights Centre of Ireland (MRCI)  
 Representatives 3
 Workers 9
National Employment Rights Authority (NERA) 1
Political party  
 Fine Gael Spokesperson on Enterprise, Trade & Employment 1
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institutionalism and the punctuated equilibrium model in particular offer an effective 
lens through which to study JLC change. A key issue in the historical institutional 
approach is the influence of power distributional struggles on institutional change and 
this is prevalent to the discussion on the choices made by collective actors in triggering 
and determining the change in the JLC system (Thelen, 2010). For example, Mahoney 
and Thelen (2010: 9–10) note that if institutions disadvantage subordinate groups, they 
can organise and challenge institutional arrangements.
Some previous research examined the history of JLCs and the reasons for their sta-
bility during the twentieth century. The predecessors of JLCs and Wages Councils in 
Britain were the trades boards and their establishment has been well documented 
(Blackburn, 2009; Clegg, 1970; Deakin and Green, 2009). They were created by the 
British government in 1909 and were intended to protect vulnerable workers in sweated 
trades characterised by terrible working conditions and child labour. When Ireland 
became a Free State in 1922, the legislation on trade boards was retained and, in 1946, 
the Irish government chose to rename them as JLCs and increased their powers. One 
way institutions retain their status quo is when their designers create significant barriers 
to change (Pierson, 2000). In the case of JLCs, their foundation in legislation under the 
Industrial Relations Act 1946 meant that their abolition would be difficult. Until recent 
years, the JLC system remained stable. There were periods of gradual change which did 
not affect the deeply-rooted structure of the JLC system. Individual JLCs were created 
and abolished usually in response to the changing labour market. While trades boards 
covered mostly small trades in clothing, JLCs evolved with the labour market and now 
mostly cover employment in the services sector such as hotels, catering, security, retail 
and contract cleaning – employments which satisfy the criteria for JLC creation: low 
pay and inadequate collective bargaining. Thirteen individual JLCs in 11 sectors, some 
covering specific geographical regions, protect 168,000 employees, accounting for 
approximately 9% of all employees in Ireland (Turner and O’Sullivan, 2011). Thus, part 
of the reason for JLCs’ survival is that they adapted to the changing labour market 
(O’Sullivan and Wallace, 2011).
In addition to their adaptation, O’Sullivan and Wallace (2011) argue that other factors 
contributed to the stability of JLCs during the twentieth century. In contrast to the experi-
ence of the British Wages Councils, there was an absence of an Irish political party which 
pursued strong neoliberal labour market policies and employer organisations had rela-
tively benign attitudes towards JLCs. Even when some employer organisations criticised 
JLCs, this was generally directed at their operation and changes were sought through the 
system of tripartite social partnership. National social partnership agreements deter-
mined pay increases for unionised employments and made commitments on economic 
and social policy. They were agreed by employer organisations, trade unions and the 
government since 1987 but could not survive the economic crisis and collapsed in 2009. 
In the social partnership agreement agreed in 2004, IBEC successfully sought a review 
of the JLC system and on foot of the review, the social partners committed to modernise 
the system in the subsequent social partnership agreement agreed in 2006. This provided 
the basis for JLC members, including IBEC and SIPTU, to negotiate and correct anoma-
lies in the system such as multiple Catering JLCs setting different minimum pay rates for 
different geographical areas. Thus Ireland’s major employer organisations were 
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members on JLCs and any changes they sought were negotiated through the social part-
nership system, contributing to their stability. However, this stability was put in doubt 
following the formation of the QSFA. As the rest of the article illustrates, the QSFA is 
one of a new breed of ‘outsider’ employer associations which perceives its interests to be 
disadvantaged by existing institutional arrangements; and has acted accordingly by 
legally challenging the JLC system.
Driver for change: The fast-food challenge
The legal challenge by fast-food employers against the Catering JLC was not the first 
time such a case had been taken. A constitutional case against the Hotels JLC was initi-
ated in 2007 by a hotel employer and the employers’ association, the Irish Hotels 
Federation, which was represented on the Hotels JLC. However, a High Court decision 
was never issued because the case was withdrawn as a result of a settlement reached 
between the Irish Hotels Federation and SIPTU in which it was agreed that the employ-
ers’ case would be dropped in return for the JLC minimum pay and conditions being 
renegotiated. Following the agreement, the Irish Hotels Federation returned to partici-
pate on the Hotels JLC as an employer member. In interviews, a SIPTU official stated 
that the employer association was concerned about the negative publicity and court 
costs associated with the case and was ‘very relieved’ that the issue was settled out of 
court. A representative of the QSFA stated that some employers were not satisfied that 
the hotels case was settled out of court and that the constitutionality issue was not 
decided. When a fast-food employer and the QSFA launched their constitutional chal-
lenge in 2008, they used the same legal argument as the hotels employers used: that the 
power of the JLC and the Labour Court to issue an ERO was unconstitutional. The 
employers referred to the 1937 Irish Constitution which states that law-making power 
rests with the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) and that therefore only Parliament should 
have the power to set legally binding pay and conditions. In addition, the employers 
argued that the Constitution guarantees the right to the protection of private property 
and that the setting of EROs breached employers’ right to fair procedures guaranteed in 
the European Convention of Human Rights (High Court, 2008). Our analysis suggests 
that three factors prompted the fast-food constitutional challenge: first, employers were 
reacting to the improved enforcement of JLC regulations; second, employers claim that 
the existence of an NMW meant that the JLCs were no longer necessary; and third, there 
appeared to be increasing dissatisfaction with the operational and structural features of 
JLCs amongst employers. We now discuss these factors below in more detail.
Enforcement of JLC regulations
Enforcement of, and compliance with, minimum wages has long been a concern of pro-
ponents of a minimum wage including the Webbs (Metcalf, 2009). Stewart (1993: 318) 
contends that all regulatory regimes rest on the assumption that the greater part of the 
target population will obey the law voluntarily. If this were not the case, compliance 
problems would be so massive as to ‘render the law unworkable’. As Stewart (1993: 320) 
accurately reflects, those who need the law (imposed on them) the most, are more likely 
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to want to evade it, while those who are more law-abiding anyway will be more likely to 
comply: ‘the bad will tend to drive out the good, unless formidable efforts are made at 
enforcement’. Weil (2009) argues, in the case of the USA, that the long-term reduction 
in government resources towards enforcement of wages and other regulations contrib-
uted to the growth of vulnerable workers. In Ireland, until 2000, enforcement of JLC 
regulations and other employment laws were carried out by just 10 government labour 
inspectors. This low number was criticised by the European Committee of Social Rights/
Committee of Independent Experts (Council of Europe, 1999: 395–397) and between 
2000 and 2005, the number of labour inspectors was gradually increased to 32. During 
interviews, a representative of McDonald’s Ireland commented on enforcement:
. . . the poor labour inspectorate there was only 30 of them. There’s no way they can get around 
the whole country so the regulation was inconsistent and patchy at best so there were no 
implications and people just operated on industry norms . . .
However, there was a considerable change in the Irish system after two high profile 
disputes in 2005 involving the GAMA construction company and Irish Ferries, which 
raised a debate about a ‘race to the bottom’. These disputes involved breaches of 
employment regulations and led to strong pressure from trade unions in social partner-
ship negotiations for improvements in employment rights compliance resulting in the 
creation of a new body, the National Employment Rights Authority (NERA). It was 
created to enforce the NMW and JLC regulations and the social partners also agreed 
that the number of labour inspectors would be increased to 90. While the number had 
only increased to 69 by 2010, the increase in the number of inspectors and the creation 
of NERA led to greater inspection activity. This exposed employers who had not paid 
employees correctly and arguably became a major trigger for the QSFA’s constitutional 
challenge. A Supermac’s representative commented:
It went from being half regulated in that the Department of Labour sent an inspector once 
every five years to suddenly 90 inspectors from NERA who were like dogs with bones 
constantly calling to catch you out; threatening people that were struggling to keep their head 
above water. . . . People were in tears . . . it wasn’t because of staff or customers, it was 
because of NERA.
A VFI official argued that fast-food employers took the constitutional challenge 
because ‘in the last 12 months NERA have done a rampage around the country to justify 
their existence’. The IBEC official noted a perception amongst catering employers that 
they were being singled out for inspections and a senior NERA representative confirmed 
that the catering sector had been targeted in 2008, 2009 and 2010 as the sector had been,
. . . identified as an industry ‘at risk’ of breaches of minimum regulations and underpayments 
because of its low pay and high numbers of migrant workers.
In 2008, NERA found breaches of JLC regulations and other employment legislation 
in 73% of inspections in catering (NERA, 2009). The NERA representative noted that 
there was no noticeable difference in compliance rates between larger and smaller 
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employers and that the main reasons given by employers for non-compliance with EROs 
were a lack of awareness of them, a lack of understanding of their contents and an inabil-
ity to pay the minimum rates. An IBEC official commented that,
. . . with the behaviour of NERA, employers who thought they were compliant through lack of 
awareness and not through malice or criminal intent are liable for retrospection.
However, there seems little doubt that compliance in the catering sector remains a 
major problem, with the number of catering organisations found non-compliant increas-
ing to 79% in 2009 (NERA, 2010).
The high level of breaches in catering is not unique to Ireland. In the USA, Weil 
(2010) notes that the large number of low-wage jobs in the catering industry makes it 
prone to minimum wage and hours violations. Research found 40% non-compliance 
with minimum wage and overtime regulations among fast-food outlets owned by the top 
20 national chains (Ji and Weil, 2009). This is supported by other research, which has 
found many similar examples of inaccurate wages, non-compliance for unsociable hours 
premiums, pay groupings and the problem of unpaid work in US-owned fast-food giants 
worldwide and also in several of their European competitors (Royle, 2004, 2010). A 
senior McDonald’s Ireland representative suggested that the increased activity of NERA 
meant that, ‘the level of financial exposure per businesses . . . is absolutely enormous’. 
Employers were liable to up to three years’ retrospective payments of minimum wages 
for any detected underpayment and it was estimated that the retrospective exposure for a 
business would be in the region of €50,000–€100,000 (ST£45,000–£90,000) (interview, 
QSFA). Employers who had underpaid employees and had difficulty in paying back the 
money could come to an instalment arrangement with its workers and NERA whereby 
wages were repaid over a period of time. Employers who did not cooperate with NERA 
and/or were found to have repeated offences were liable to criminal prosecution leading 
to possible fines or imprisonment. The possibility of criminal prosecution in the case of 
the JLC regulations marks a departure from much other employment legislation. Under 
most individual employment laws covering, for example, unfair dismissals, employment 
equality, maternity leave or terms of employment, individuals can seek enforcement of 
their entitlements through referral to specialist state agencies and not through criminal 
prosecution. A SIPTU official stated that improved enforcement was key to the fast-food 
employers’ constitutional challenge:
. . . NERA came in, started to do inspections. . . . What they’re saying and they’ve said it 
publicly – they haven’t been paying it and now they being forced to do something that wasn’t 
being enforced. Because they’re being forced.
Unsurprisingly, the SIPTU official had little sympathy for QSFA’s arguments regard-
ing the burden of paying back unpaid wages:
I make it simple. If a worker was employed in a restaurant and was taking money out of the till, 
stealing the money, putting in their pocket, the employer caught them they would be dismissed, 
prosecuted and all that would go with that and probably jailed if they were stealing, but an 
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employer has been doing it for years . . . taking money out of workers’ pockets, but what they 
want to do, they want to change the law to make it legal what they have been doing illegally.
As employers came under more pressure to comply with JLC rates they argued that 
the effects of complying with JLC regulations were a loss of competitiveness and reduced 
working hours and jobs. In addition, employer representatives argued that the JLC rates 
were harder to pay as there had been increases in other operational costs such as rent, 
water and insurance costs, beef prices and licences. The QSFA and VFI argued that JLC 
regulations placed fast-food employers in the Republic of Ireland at a competitive disad-
vantage to those in Northern Ireland, where there is no equivalent of the JLCs; a QSFA 
spokesperson stated:
The actual minimum wage for the catering sector here is €9.31. . . . If you incorporate all the 
other benefits like paid break and time and a third that they don’t have [in Northern Ireland]. 
They don’t have Sunday premium, they don’t have late night premium. Overtime doesn’t have 
to be applied until 64 hours or something like that . . . the Irish national minimum wage for the 
catering sector is probably around €12 compared to €6 in the North and the €6 is only applicable 
to people over 21.
However, most Irish employers are unlikely to be affected by the lower wage rates in 
Northern Ireland unless they are located close to the border and this argument does not 
take into account the difference in the cost of living, which is substantially higher in the 
Republic. Employers were particularly critical of the Sunday premium set by the Catering 
JLC because they argued that Sunday pay should be no different to any other day in a 
seven-day week business. A McDonald’s representative argued that the consequence of 
the Sunday premium was that: ‘businesses started closing on Sundays all around the 
country’. Similarly, a QSFA spokesperson stated:
Particularly in this climate what we were faced with the application of the JLC at this time and 
particularly with Sunday pay is two things: increased costs on Sundays that would make it 
unviable to work on Sundays and the retrospective pay that would literally cripple businesses.
Even though employers suggested that general operational costs were rising, they 
attributed the loss of jobs to JLC rates. A Supermac’s representative stated that the JLC 
rates could lead to closures, which would remove jobs altogether. Labour costs represent 
around 30% of total costs for fast-food employers and they are one of the few areas fast-
food employers can make significant savings and, unlike utility costs, employers feel 
that JLC minimum regulations can be challenged (see Leidner, 2002; Royle, 2010). As 
the McDonald’s representative admitted, ‘labour costs are the only variable that can be 
managed’.
The arguments made by employers on the effects of JLC regulations reflect the clas-
sical economic contention that minimum wages increase unemployment (Brown et al., 
1982; Kaufman, 2009; Neumark and Wascher, 1992). Similarly, the neoliberal British 
Conservative governments from 1979 used the ‘reduction in employment’ argument to 
justify a restriction of the scope of the Wages Councils from 1986 and then their almost 
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complete abolition in 1993, removing minimum wage protection for approximately 10% 
of the active labour force (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005). However, there is evidence that 
minimum wages do not have a significant negative impact on employment and can have 
positive effects (Böckerman and Uusitalo, 2009; Card and Krueger, 1995; Deakin and 
Green, 2009; Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005; Rubery, 1997; Wilkinson, 1983). In relation 
to the impact of overtime rates and Sunday premiums set by JLCs, the evidence on the 
earnings of JLC workers does not support the employers’ argument. Only a small per-
centage of workers covered by JLCs work overtime and the number of overtime hours 
worked by them is very low, amounting to an average of just 30 minutes per week (Turner 
and O’Sullivan, 2011). Research internationally shows that large fast-food operators take 
great care to ensure that their predominantly part-time workforce are utilised in a manner 
that will almost guarantee that overtime rates can nearly always be avoided (Royle, 
2010).
The constitutional challenge was taken in the early stages of a major downturn in the 
economy; however, employer respondents suggested that this was not a significant factor 
contributing to the challenge. Despite the claim that businesses were closing because of 
the JLC pay rates, it is worth noting that the multinational fast-food giants were doing 
well in the recession as consumers ‘traded down’ their eating habits to save money 
(Royle, 2010; Wood, 2012). Supermac’s pre-tax profits quadrupled in 2009 leading its 
managing director to comment that, ‘the current recession had resulted in consumers 
opting for value for money as opposed to paying high restaurant prices’ (Connacht 
Tribune, 2009; Deegan, 2009). In fact there appeared to be a general consensus amongst 
employers that the QSFA challenge would probably have happened even without an 
economic downturn. The McDonald’s representative stated that: ‘the recession acceler-
ated it but the constitutional challenge or some challenge would have taken place’. 
Nevertheless, the recession appears to have led to a greater level of non-compliance, 
more difficulty in collecting arrears and more employers reporting non-compliance by 
competitor employers as unfair competition has become more transparent (interview, 
NERA).
NMW and legislation
One of the arguments made by employers against JLC regulation is that the existence of 
a NMW since 2000 makes JLCs unnecessary. In addition, employers argue that JLCs are 
irrelevant because of the vast array of employment legislation governing the employ-
ment relationship. The McDonald’s representative stated that, ‘there has always been this 
sense of JLCs covering more vulnerable sectors, but from our point of view the [national] 
minimum wage is quite high’.
The VFI representative was more aggressive on the relevance of the JLC system in the 
context of current employment law, stating that the system is,
. . . a throwback to the 1970s when we didn’t have the type of legislation in place that we have 
today in relation to employment law and it’s probably anti-competitive. In a nutshell: a waste 
of time. It amounts to overregulation.
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The QSFA representative also stated:
There was no [national] minimum wage when JLCs were first created. Now we have roughly 
25 pieces of legislation governing employee rights that weren’t there 30 or 40 years ago and we 
feel that’s enough of a base to work from . . . there’s enough with the minimum wage there. The 
minimum wage has such an impact on the economy generally that it should be controlled by the 
government and with proper advice from economists and not just a group of people sitting 
around a table and making up their own mind on it.
Structure and operation of JLCs
Employers expressed frustration over a number of operational and structural features of 
JLCs. One feature is that for some sectors, there were two JLCs covering different geo-
graphical regions and these JLCs operated independently of each other, setting different 
minimum rates of pay. Employers argued against the resultant competitive inequalities 
whereby ‘you would have two stores a mile apart under different terms and conditions’ 
(interview, McDonald’s). Another frustration lay with the definition of a catering organi-
sation under JLC regulations. According to the Catering EROs, a catering establishment 
is a premises primarily used for supplying food or drink for consumption on the prem-
ises. Fast-food employers have argued that fast-food outlets which do not own seating 
(such as in a communal food court) should not be covered by JLCs. The QSFA repre-
sentative stated that:
A takeaway-only premises is not included on the JLC if it’s for consumption off the premises so 
therefore I’m at a disadvantage because I’ve got seating. . . . Their staff do not do any duties beyond 
that of a normal takeaway so it’s a very strong argument and I hope they’re successful. Again it 
shows how many problems you have with JLCs as it stands. It serves to confuse everything.
SIPTU disagreed with this, arguing that once an establishment serves food, then it is 
covered by the JLC. This issue was resolved in 2009 by the Labour Court when it deter-
mined that fast-food employees working in food courts were covered by JLCs (Busy Bee 
Bagels Ltd and NERA, Labour Court Decision No. Dec092).
Part of the QSFA constitutional challenge is that employers’ rights to fair procedures 
and due process under the European Convention of Human Rights were breached. The 
basis for this claim is that there was no provision for an employer to claim an inability to 
pay the JLC rates and there was no right of appeal once an ERO was made. Employers 
contrasted this with an inability to pay provision which was available in social partner-
ship agreements and which is available in regard to the NMW. Interestingly though, no 
employer has ever made an application claiming an inability to pay the NMW. While 
there is no right of appeal for either employers or workers once an ERO is set, proposed 
EROs are published and the public is given the opportunity to voice objections and these 
must be considered by the JLC.
Employers also alleged that chairpersons of JLCs were biased towards proposals 
made by the worker representatives on JLCs. JLC chairpersons have a casting vote 
when employer and worker members are unable to agree, giving them considerable 
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influence over the outcome. A Supermac’s representative commented that employers 
who attended JLC meetings stated that the casting vote, ‘99.9% of the time would go 
with the union side of the things . . . it was an absolute futile worthless exercise’. The 
McDonald’s representative stated that the employer members had attempted to change 
the Sunday premium pay within JLCs for years but that ‘the chair has never once voted 
in favour on the side of the employer’. Similarly, IBEC and VFI officials stated that 
chairpersons did not vote for employer motions. This is not a new complaint by employ-
ers. In a survey of JLC members in 2005, over 40% of employer respondents thought 
that the casting vote was unfair because chairpersons were biased towards workers 
proposals (O’Sullivan and Wallace, 2005). The IBEC representative argued that the 
power of casting vote should be removed from chairpersons,
. . . if there is supposed to be agreement in a voluntary system, then chairs should be facilitators 
or mediators to facilitate agreement. If they agree, agree. If they don’t agree, they don’t agree.
The IBEC representative argued that such a system would encourage better dialogue. 
However, when this issue was considered by a review of the JLC system in 2005, the 
review authors recommended that the chairperson’s casting vote be retained; otherwise, 
they concluded, there would be a possibility that JLCs could not resolve issues (O’Sullivan 
and Wallace, 2005).
Fast-food employers and the future of JLCs
With regard to the issue of whether or not JLCs should be abolished, the QSFA repre-
sentative stated that, ‘we would like to see the JLC system gone, we would like to work 
off the [national] minimum wage structure . . . to get some breathing space at this 
particular time. We can get NERA off our back at a time we really don’t need it.’ The 
Supermac’s representative did not explicitly state that JLCs should be abolished but 
questioned why people in an unskilled job, with no experience, who receive no exter-
nal training and who are trained on the job should get a higher premium through JLCs 
than those who work in non-JLC covered industries. It was SIPTU’s belief that the aim 
of the constitutional challenge was to dismantle the JLC system:
The issue is a political one which is to dismantle the ERO system completely, the JLCs, to make 
them unconstitutional and bring everybody down to the NMW with no protection for rosters 
and no protection for hours of work and all the other stuff that’s contained in the ERO.
While the QSFA said there was no ‘plan B’ if the legal challenge was unsuccessful, 
they also stated that they had lobbied the then Minister for Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment over the issue of retrospective payments for unpaid wages. Fast-food 
chains also have a history of lobbying governments to dilute minimum regulations in 
other countries. In the 1970s in the USA for example, in the aftermath of the Watergate 
scandal, it was discovered that McDonald’s had contributed $250,000 to the Nixon re-
election campaign at a time when there was a bill going through Congress that would 
exempt part-time students from getting the minimum wage; it was later dubbed the 
McDonald’s Bill (Royle, 2000, 2010). Barry and Wilkinson (2011: 154) note the trend 
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internationally for employer associations to become more active in lobbying, opinion 
formation and developing political influence.
Government role in change and stability of JLCs
For successive governments since the 1980s, their role in balancing the interests of 
employers and trade unions and in responding to significant industrial relations problems 
was done through social partnership. In addition to employer associations using social 
partnership to achieve operational changes to JLCs, trade unions also used social partner-
ship to protect them. Following the launch of the first constitutional challenge against a 
JLC by a hotel employer in 2007, the trade unions sought a commitment through social 
partnership that the JLC system would be strengthened to protect it from legal chal-
lenges. The government and employer associations, including IBEC, in social partner-
ship agreed to this. The then Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrat coalition government’s 
stated position was one of support for JLCs. The then Minister for Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment, Micheál Martin, stated: (Wall, 2008):
. . . we will certainly be at one with the trade union side in terms of making sure that this 
particular edifice is shored up in whatever way it takes. We believe in common basic standards 
and will do whatever we have to.
The government introduced an Industrial Relations (Amendment) Bill 2009 which 
proposed to retain the JLCs. To effectively derail the employers’ constitutional argument, 
the Bill proposed that any ERO from the JLCs and the Labour Court would be approved 
by the Parliament. While satisfying union concerns, the government also sought to 
address some employer concerns about the operation of JLCs. The Bill proposed that 
JLCs would consider certain issues when proposing EROs such as the prevailing eco-
nomic circumstances and the legitimate interests of workers and employers as well as 
including an employer inability to pay clause in certain circumstances. A government 
minister said that the Bill would balance the demands of unions and employers and gave 
an assurance ‘that the proposed provision would not be a carte blanche for derogation 
from the minimum wages and conditions prescribed in an ERO’ (Department of 
Enterprise, Trade and Innovation,2 2011). In spite of the Bill, the QSFA continued with 
its legal case because the Bill did not address the issue of employers being prosecuted for 
retrospective payments for underpaying workers (interview, Supermac’s).
Given the government’s supportive stance on JLCs, the QSFA and VFI representa-
tives hoped that a change of government in the subsequent general election in 2011 
would change their circumstances. The then main opposition party Fine Gael tradition-
ally had strong support from employers and this was reflected in comments made by the 
party’s spokesperson for Enterprise, Trade and Employment, Dr Leo Varadkar. He said 
he opposed the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Bill because:
. . . all that Bill does really is to make [JLC system] constitutional. We think that’s wrong. We 
think there’s an opportunity here and now to actually bring in a new system. . . . I’d let the 
courts strike it down and then that would be the opportunity to bring in a new system. I think 
[the Minister] is actually giving up her opportunity to negotiate a new system by bringing in 
this legislation.
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However, the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Bill 2009 was never introduced as 
the government’s attention turned to managing the escalating economic crisis. Indeed, 
the crisis emerged as a second potential driver for change as employers increasingly 
criticised the NMW and JLC minimum pay rates. In late 2010, the IMF/EU/ECB pro-
vided a financial assistance package to Ireland and as part of the deal, the government 
committed to reducing the NMW by €1 per hour and to undertake an independent 
review of the JLC system. Three months later following a general election, a new Fine 
Gael/Labour Party coalition government was in place and it restored the NMW to its 
previous level of €8.65 per hour. The independent review of JLCs was completed in 
April 2011 and it rejected many of the arguments made by employers for the abolition 
of the JLCs, such as that employment would increase significantly (Duffy and Walsh, 
2011). The review recommended that JLCs should be retained but reformed.
The new Industrial Relations (Amendment) Bill 2011 proposed that JLCs would be 
retained but the reforms were more far reaching than those in the 2009 Bill. The Bill 
stipulates that JLCs would no longer set Sunday premiums or any other conditions of 
employment where legislation already existed; that record-keeping requirements for 
employers would be reduced; that employers would be able to claim inability to pay JLC 
rates; and that JLC members would have to consider a list of factors in making minimum 
wage decisions including unemployment levels, competitiveness and wage levels in 
comparable sectors in other countries. There was immediate criticism of the proposal to 
eliminate Sunday premiums by trade unions while employer associations like IBEC said 
that JLCs should be abolished (Wall, 2011). The Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and 
Innovation’s view on the effects of JLC regulations was clear when he stated ‘the urgent 
need to protect and create jobs in these sectors has driven my determination over the past 
four months to see through comprehensive and radical reform in this area’ (Department 
of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, 2011). The proposals were supported by the European 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Economic and Monetary Affairs who, in line with 
the neoliberal orientated European Employment Strategy (Royle, 2012), said that the 
government’s commitment to radical reform of JLCs ‘is welcome, as eliminating any 
impediments to job creation/reallocation, while safeguarding basic workers’ rights, is 
essential to ensure that the emerging recovery benefits all’ (Higgins, 2011). Despite the 
absence of social partnership in 2009, the Minister sought consultation on his proposals 
from the social partners IBEC and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. There were some 
minor changes made to the proposals following consultation but most of the original ele-
ments remain in the draft legislation.
Discussion
In the fast-food industry where there is effectively no union workplace representation, 
employers have largely been unilaterally determining wage rates, often ignoring the rates 
set by the JLC system. Studies in other countries have shown that this is not unusual for this 
kind of industry; fast-food employers are continually looking to reduce labour costs, as 
labour is one of the few areas where savings can be made. This has led to a variety of labour 
rights violations from health and safety to unpaid overtime; ‘off-the-clock’ work; ‘shaving’ 
and other pay discrepancies; works council and union-busting violations; and an often 
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systematic inability to enforce collective agreements where these exist (Leidner, 2002; 
Reiter, 2002; Royle, 2000, 2010). It is perhaps ironic that the Irish trade unions’ success in 
acquiring better enforcement of the JLC system appears to be one of the key factors in 
prompting the legal challenge. Instead of enforcement acting as a self-reinforcing process 
which contributed to the stability of the JLC system, it arguably had the opposite effect. 
Improved enforcement increased the detection of violations and left an increasing number 
of employers liable for back payments.
Actors’ use of other institutions to enact change has been highlighted in the institu-
tional change literature (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). In the case of JLCs, different 
employer associations tried to enact change through other institutions, though the type 
of change sought and institution used differed significantly. Despite growing complaints 
about JLCs by employer associations represented on them, they did not take legal 
action. In IBEC’s case, this was because, ‘it’s not our practice to fund legal challenges. 
We prefer to engage and fashion an agreement.’ The VFI and IBEC officials stated that 
if the public policy deemed that the JLC system should remain, then employers would 
require fundamental changes to the system in order to retain their support. In other 
words, they believed it was ‘better to be in than out’ of the system (interview, IBEC). 
IBEC and the VFI are ‘insider organisations’ in that they are represented on JLCs and 
have not sought to dismantle them from within. IBEC in particular has a history of 
negotiating with trade unions and, as noted, when they have had concerns about specific 
issues relating to JLCs, they have sought changes through a traditional industrial rela-
tions institution – social partnership. Sheehan (2008) suggests that while IBEC may be 
opposed to over-regulation, it has been concerned that member firms should stay within 
established institutional structures. Even when the Irish Hotels Federation was part of 
the first constitutional challenge against JLCs, they withdrew the case following nego-
tiations with SIPTU. Arguably this first case provided the ground work to the fast-food 
employers’ subsequent legal challenge.
The QSFA was critical of existing employer organisations, arguing that they were:
. . . out of touch . . . in respect to the JLC, we feel IBEC haven’t done us a whole lot of favours 
in the past in relation to look what we got, look what we have on our doorstep. We’re not 
particularly happy with their performance up to now.
We noted earlier that institutions can be challenged by groups who are disadvantaged 
by them (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Certainly, fast-food employers perceived them-
selves as disadvantaged by the ERO-setting process and ERO regulations and it is in this 
context that they created their own employers’ association. The QSFA is an ‘outsider 
organisation’, with no representation on JLCs, no history of negotiating with unions and 
no participation in social partnership. Thus, the QSFA chose the legal system as the 
mechanism for enacting change. The creation of the QSFA harps back to one of the 
rationales for employer association formation in the early twentieth century: ‘to respond 
to encroachments by, the state, as governments began to comprehensively regulate 
employment’ (Barry and Wilkinson, 2011: 152). The nature of the QSFA response to 
state regulation occurred in the context of growing instances of employer opposition to 
traditional industrial relations institutions. For example, indigenous employers such as 
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Aer Lingus and Ryanair had started to adopt a more hardened stance towards state dis-
pute resolution institutions and this confidence reflects the continuing shift in the balance 
of power to employers (Roche, 2007; Sheehan, 2008). Research on employer associa-
tions suggests there are often tensions between satisfying the interests of larger and 
smaller employers (see Grote et al., 2007). However, the QSFA includes large multina-
tionals and indigenous small outlets that are unified by their operation in a low-wage 
sector under a ‘productive system’ that competes on low cost rather than quality 
(McLaughlin, 2009: 329).
The creation of the QSFA may also reflect a similar pattern of behaviour in Germany 
in the 1990s, where after nearly 20 years of refusing to take part in company- or sector-
level collective bargaining, McDonald’s and other US-owned fast-food companies estab-
lished a German fast-food employers’ association and for the first time negotiated a 
sector-level collective agreement in 1989. Royle (2000, 2002, 2004) argues that this 
action was taken to improve the image of fast-food employers, who had been receiving 
a lot of negative publicity over labour conditions and their refusal to recognise unions. 
Collective agreements brought improved media coverage and also allowed wages and 
conditions to be more closely calibrated to the requirements of fast-food employers 
rather than that of the hotel and catering sectors more generally. However, this did not 
stop fast-food employers and the new German fast-food association from continuing to 
prevent unions from gaining a presence within the outlets.
It has been suggested that a focus on the punctuated equilibrium model can mask 
more gradual changes in institutions, resulting in ‘drift’ akin to that which has occurred 
in the collective bargaining system in Germany (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Thelen, 
2009). While there were some gradual changes regarding the JLC system, such as IBEC’s 
successful request under social partnership that they be modernised, the potential for 
gradual change endogenously within the institution was restricted by the legislation gov-
erning JLCs. In addition to the legislation setting out rules on how JLCs operate, a series 
of criteria had to be fulfilled before an individual JLC could be abolished, making it dif-
ficult for an employer association to successfully achieve abolition of the system.
In punctuated equilibrium theory, the timing of events can be significant as well as the 
event that triggers change. The fast-food employers launched their legal case in late 2008 
but it was not heard and decided upon until 2011, during which time the economy went 
into freefall, the social partnership process collapsed and a new government was elected. 
These elements played different roles in contributing to, and restraining, the changes 
which the JLC system is undergoing. The demise of social partnership and growing eco-
nomic crisis meant that the 2009 Bill which proposed to protect JLCs was not pushed 
through as it might have been and this would have undermined the legal basis for the 
fast-food employers’ case. The disintegrating economy fuelled the employer discourse 
on the negative impact of JLC rates, particularly overtime rates for Sunday working. The 
Restaurants Association of Ireland argued that 37% of restaurants closed on Sundays 
because of JLC premiums and said 4000 jobs would be created if JLCs were abolished 
(www.rai.ie). This discourse has influenced the recent proposed legislation, which will 
remove the power of JLCs to set a Sunday premium rate and JLCs will have to consider 
competitiveness and unemployment issues in deciding basic minimum pay rates in the 
future.
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Thelen (2010) comments that higher unemployment and budget constraints have 
limited policy makers’ room for manoeuvre. It might be expected that policy makers would 
have abolished JLCs but Lowndes (1996: 193) contends that institutions have legitimacy 
beyond the preferences of individual actors. There was some degree of ‘political lock-in’ 
in pursuing a public policy in which JLCs would exist and this is likely to have been 
influenced by the coalition nature of the new government. O’Sullivan and Wallace (2011: 
23), commenting on Ireland’s political history, note that ‘coalitions involving Labour and 
Fine Gael effectively exclude the pursuit of an anti-regulation agenda based on neo-lib-
eralism’. Despite the fall of social partnership, its legacy was arguably influential in 
deciding the future of JLCs. Social partnership agreements consisted of negotiated trade-
offs between unions and employers and this is true in the case of the future of JLCs. The 
government chose to consult with those actors who held power during the social partner-
ship era rather than the outsider employer associations. While the stability of the system 
has likely been secured, this has been in return for significant operational change.
In regard to the extent of change of the JLC system, it would appear that functional 
transformation has not occurred. The criteria for the creation of JLCs, and therefore their 
raison d’être, will still be the same: to protect low-paid workers where collective bar-
gaining is inadequate. However, there has been some reorientation of the reconfigured 
JLC system. Gersick (1991: 31) notes that revolutionary periods can vary in how much 
they benefit or harm a system. The legal challenge and the proposed changes may have 
harmful consequences for workers, in five respects. First, since the High Court ruling 
found the Catering JLC unconstitutional, the previous minimum pay and conditions it set 
are null and void and so it is very unlikely that employers who were found to have 
breached JLC pay rates will be prosecuted, leaving many workers without back pay. 
Second, there is a new provision that employers in financial difficulty can seek an exemp-
tion from the minimum pay rates and this can be done with or without the agreement of 
employees. This differs to NMW legislation in which the majority of workers must agree 
to an exemption. Third, the ruling on JLC unconstitutionality and the creation of new 
legislation mean that new EROs will have to be made and it is likely to be difficult for 
workers’ representatives to able to retain the minimum pay and conditions of previous 
EROs given the economic environment (see Higgins, 2011). Fourth, a key barrier to the 
JLCs’ capacity to protect workers lies in the criteria which representatives will have to 
consider in making decisions on future EROs. The proposed criteria which JLC members 
will have to consider are likely to make the decision-making process very cumbersome 
and there is no guidance as to which of the criteria should be given greater weight in 
decision-making. It has also yet to be determined what would happen if an employer 
legally challenged a new ERO on the basis that a JLC had not given due consideration to 
one of the criteria. Fifth is the proposal that there will be additional steps in resolving a 
deadlock between employer and worker representatives on JLCs, which will likely 
increase the length of time it will take to make an ERO.
Conclusion
This article adds to knowledge by illustrating how institutions like JLCs may be chal-
lenged by new employer association interest groups – such as the QSFA – who perceive 
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themselves as ‘outsider organisations’ disadvantaged by the institutional status quo. The 
government chose a politically expedient response to the employers’ challenge. The 
influence of the Labour Party as a coalition partner and the legacy of social partnership 
in which successive governments have attempted to address industrial relations prob-
lems by giving something to both sides – enough for them to live with – have arguably 
resulted in their retention. However, the trade-offs for their retention are significant. 
Unrepresented workers will have little option but to accept sub-minimum pay rates if 
requested and the list of criteria which JLC members will have to consider may make the 
system unworkable and redundant as a mechanism for protecting employees. Such 
changes may have a similar impact to the changes which diluted the powers of the British 
Wages Councils in the 1980s.
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Notes
1. JLCs propose minimum pay and conditions, which are approved by a state industrial relations 
dispute resolution body, the Labour Court, and the resultant ERO is given legal effect by the 
Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation.
2. The department was renamed the Department of Jobs, Trade and Innovation in 2011.
References
Barry M and Wilkinson A (2011) Reconceptualising employer associations under evolving employ-
ment relations: Countervailing power revisited. Work, Employment and Society 25: 149–162.
Blackburn S (2009) Curse or cure? Why was the enactment of Britain’s 1909 Trade Boards Act so 
controversial? British Journal of Industrial Relations 47: 205–213.
Böckerman P and Uusitalo R (2009) Minimum wages and youth employment: Evidence from the 
Finnish retail trade sector. British Journal of Industrial Relations 47: 388–405.
Braun V and Clarke V (2008) Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in 
Psychology 2: 77–101.
Brown C, Gilroy C and Kohen A (1982) The effect of the minimum wage on employment and 
unemployment. Journal of Economic Literature 20: 487–528.
Busenberg GJ (2003) Agenda setting and policy evolution, theories and applications. In: Midwest 
Political Science Association Meeting.
Card D and Krueger AB (1995) Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum 
Wage. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Clegg HA (1970) The System of Industrial Relations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Connacht Tribune (2009) Supermac’s takes the fast road. The Connacht Tribune, 17 December. 
Available at: www.galwaynews.ie/10232-supermacs-takes-fast-road.
Council of Europe (1999) European Social Charter: European Committee of Social Rights/
Committee of Independent Experts – Conclusions XIV-2. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
Deakin S and Green F (2009) One hundred years of British minimum wage legislation. British 
Journal of Industrial Relations 47: 205–213.
O’Sullivan and Royle 19
Deakin S and Wilkinson F (2005) The Law of the Labour Market: Industrialisation, Employment, 
and Legal Evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Deegan G (2009) Pretax profits quadruple for Supermac’s holding firm. The Irish Times, 16 
December. Available at: www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance/2009/1216/1224260759868.
html.
Department of Enterprise, Trade and Innovation (2010) Address by Minister for Labour Affairs, 
Dara Calleary T.D., on the Second Stage debate on the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Bill 
2009. Available at: www.deti.ie/press/2010/20100126.htm.
Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation (2011) Bruton announces reforms to JLC/REA 
systems. Press release, 28 July. Available at: www.djei.ie/press/2011/20110728a.htm.
Duffy K and Walsh F (2011) Report of Independent Review of Employment Regulation Orders and 
Registered Employment Agreement Wage Setting Mechanisms. Dublin: Department of Jobs, 
Enterprise and Innovation.
Ebbinghaus B (2005) Can Path Dependence Explain Institutional Change? Two Approaches 
Applied to Welfare State Reform. MPIfG Discussion Paper 05/2. Cologne: Max Planck Institute 
for the Study of Societies.
Erickson CL and Kuruvilla S (1998) Industrial relations system transformation. Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review 52: 3–21.
Gersick C (1991) Revolutionary change theories: A multilevel exploration of the punctuated equi-
librium. The Academy of Management Review 16: 10–36.
Grote J, Lang A and Traxler F (2007) Germany. In: Traxler F and Huemer G (eds) Handbook of 
Business Interest Associations, Firm Size and Governance. London and New York: Routledge, 
pp. 141–176.
Higgins C (2009) Catering JLCs face High Court challenge, national terms to be proposed. Industrial 
Relations News 6. Available at: www.irn.ie/issues/article.asp?id=14317&issueType=2.
Higgins C (2011) Bruton’s radical reform of wage-setting welcomed by EU. Industrial Relations 
News 33. Available at: www.irn.ie/issues/article.asp?id=17778&issueType=2.
High Court (2008) John Grace Fried Chicken Limited, John Grace and Quick Service Food 
Alliance Limited and the Catering Joint Labour Committee, The Labour Court, Ireland and the 
Attorney General. Plenary Summons. No. 10663 P.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2010) Ireland: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic 
and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding. Washington, DC: IMF.
Ji MW and Weil D (2009) Does ownership structure influence regulatory behavior? The impact 
of franchisee free-riding on labor standards compliance. Working Paper, Boston University.
Kaufman B (2009) Promoting labour market efficiency and fairness through a legal minimum 
wage: The Webbs and the social cost of labour. British Journal of Industrial Relations 47: 
306–326.
Krasner SD (1984) Approaches to the state: Alternative conceptions and historical dynamics. 
Comparative Politics 16(2): 223–246.
Leidner R (2002) Fast-food work in the United States. In: Royle T and Towers B (eds) Labour 
Relations in the Global Fast-food Industry. London: Routledge, pp. 8–29.
Levi M (1997) A model, a method, and a map: Rational choice in comparative and historical analy-
sis. In: Lichbach MI and Zuckerman AS (eds) Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and 
Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 19–41.
20 Economic and Industrial Democracy 0(0)
Lowndes V (1996) Varieties of new institutionalism: A critical appraisal. Public Administration 
74: 181–197.
McLaughlin C (2009) The productivity-enhancing impacts of the minimum wage: Lessons from 
Denmark and New Zealand. British Journal of Industrial Relations 47: 327–348.
Mahoney J and Thelen K (2010) A theory of gradual institutional change. In: Mahoney J and 
Thelen K (eds) Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
Metcalf D (2009) Nothing new under the sun: The prescience of W. S. Sanders’ 1906 Fabian Tract. 
British Journal of Industrial Relations 47: 289–305.
NERA (2009) Review of 2008. Dublin: National Employment Rights Authority. Available at: 
www.employmentrights.ie/en/media/NERA%20Review%20of%202008.pdf.
NERA (2010) Review of 2009. Dublin: National Employment Rights Authority. Available at: 
www.employmentrights.ie/en/aboutnera/publicationsdownloads/.
Neumark D and Wascher W (1992) Employment effects of minimum and subminimum wages: 
Panel data on state minimum wage laws. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 46: 55–81.
O’Sullivan M and Wallace J (2005) Review of the Joint Labour Committee system. Report to the 
Labour Relations Commission. Unpublished.
O’Sullivan M and Wallace J (2011) Minimum labour standards in a social partnership system: The 
persistence of the Irish variant of Wages Councils. Industrial Relations Journal 42: 18–35.
Pierson P (2000) Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. The American 
Political Science Review 94: 251–267.
Reiter E (2002) Fast-food work in Canada: Working conditions, labour law and unionization. In: 
Royle T and Towers B (eds) Labour Relations in the Global Fast Food Industry. London: 
Routledge, pp. 30–47.
Roche WK (2007) Developments in industrial relations and human resource management in 
Ireland. Quarterly Economic Commentary Spring: 62–77.
Royle T (2000) Working for McDonald’s in Europe. London and New York: Routledge.
Royle T (2002) Multinational corporations, employer associations and trade union exclusion 
strategies in the German fast-food industry. Employee Relations 24: 437–460.
Royle T (2004) Employment practices of multinationals in the Spanish and German quick food 
service sectors: Low road convergence? European Journal of Industrial Relations 10: 51–71.
Royle T (2010) McDonald’s and the global ‘McJob’: A longitudinal study of work, pay and unioni-
zation in the international fast-food industry. Labor History 51: 249–269.
Royle T (2012) Socially inclusive or exclusive? An analysis of European social policy, legislation 
and European case law. Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations 80: 25–48.
Rubery J (1997) Wages and the labour market. British Journal of Industrial Relations 35: 337–366.
Sheehan B (2008) Employers and the traditional industrial relations system. In: Hastings T (ed.) 
The State of the Unions: Challenges Facing Organised Labour in Ireland. Dublin: The Liffey 
Press, pp. 105–126.
Stewart J (1993) Rational choice theory, public policy and the liberal state. Policy Sciences 26: 
317–330.
Sweeney P and O’Brien F (2011) Is the state’s wage-setting system necessary? The Irish Times, 18 
June. Available at: www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/2011/0618/1224299152694.html.
Thelen K (2009) Institutional change in advanced political economies. British Journal of Industrial 
Relations 3: 471–498.
O’Sullivan and Royle 21
Thelen K (2010) Beyond comparative statics: Historical institutional approaches to stability and 
change in the political economy of labor. In: Richard T, Kai O, Crouch C et al. (eds) Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 42–61.
Thelen K and Steinmo S (1992) Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. In: Steinmo 
S, Thelen K and Longstreth F (eds) Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–32.
Turner T and O’Sullivan M (2011) Economic crisis and the restructuring of wage setting mecha-
nisms for vulnerable workers in Ireland. In: TASC Conference, Cork, 29 September.
Wall M (2008) Pledge to protect minimum wage. Irish Times, 25 February. Available at: www.
irishtimes.com.
Wall M (2011) IBEC accuses government of prejudicing wage-rules review. The Irish Times, 15 
March. Available at: www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2011/0315/1224292162416.
html.
Weil D (2009) Rethinking the regulation of vulnerable work in the USA: A sector-based approach. 
Journal of Industrial Relations 51: 411–430.
Weil D (2010) Improving Workplace Conditions Through Strategic Enforcement: A Report to the 
Wage and Hour Division. Boston, MA: Boston University.
Wilkinson F (1983) Productive systems. Cambridge Journal of Economics 7: 413–429.
Wood Z (2012) McDonald’s says 2,500 new jobs a lifeline for young unemployed. The Guardian, 
24 January. Available at: www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jan/24/mcdonalds-new-jobs-
young-unemployed?newsfeed=true.
Michelle O’Sullivan is a Lecturer in Industrial Relations at the University of Limerick. 
She has recently published on minimum wage regulation, employment equality law, 
trade unions and Ryanair and workplace bullying and is co-author of the textbook 
Industrial Relations in Ireland (2013).
Tony Royle is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Management in National University 
of Ireland Galway. He has published extensively on labour relations in multinational 
corporations, global labour standards, employee voice and corporate social responsibil-
ity. His most recent book is Comparative Global Employment Relations: A Critical 
Analysis (2012).Thelen K (2009) Institutional change in advanced political economies. 
British Journal of Industrial Relations 3: 471–498.
